Abstract. The volatility of interest rates is relevant for many financial applications. Under realistic assumptions the term structure of interest rate differentials provides an important predictor of the term structure of interest rates. This paper derives the term structure of differentials in a situation in which two open economies plan to enter a monetary union in the future. Two systems of floating exchange rates prior to the union are considered, namely a free-float and a managed-float regime. The volatility processes of arbitrary-term differentials under the respective pre-switch arrangements are compared. The paper elaborates the singularity of extremely short-term (i.e. instantaneous) interest rates under extensive leaning-against-the-wind interventions and discusses policy issues.
INTRODUCTION
Interest rates of different maturities are among the most fundamental prices determined in financial markets. Up to now, many models have been put forward to explain their dynamic behaviour and there still are massive ongoing research activities in the field. This enormous scientific attention may be explained by the significance of interest rates in many economic disciplines. For example, in macroeconomics interest rates play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy to inflation and real growth. Moreover, in many models longer-term interest rates affect capital movements or saving, investment and consumption decisions. In finance, interest rates and their term structure are of primary importance for most sub-areas. For instance, the volatility of arbitrary-term interest rates -which is the main concern of this paper -is a key variable in the valuation of contingent claims such as interest rate options as well as in the selection of optimal hedging strategies for risk-averse investors.
An explanation of the term structure of interest rates has long been a topic of major concern for economists. The most famous strands of theory are the expectations, the liquidity preference, the market segmentation and the preferred habitat hypotheses. Another widely celebrated approach by Cox et al. (1985) is to gain access to the term structure by using an intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing model. Although there exists an extensive body of literature on both, theoretical and empirical findings on the term structure, the topic is still far from being settled. 1 In recent years there have been several attempts to analyse the term structure of interest rates under particular exchange rate arrangements. The fundamental works are Svensson (1991a Svensson ( , 1991b who explores the term structure of interest rate differentials (i.e. the differential between pairs of domestic and foreign interest rates with the same time to maturity) in a monetary flex-price exchange rate target zone model of the Krugman (1991) type. Svensson (1991b, p. 90) offers the following justification for considering the term structure of interest rate differentials as a shortcut to analysing the term structure of interest rates:
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For a small open economy which faces an exogenous term structure of world interest rates, the domestic term structure of interest rates follows the term structure of interest rate differentials. The term structure of interest rate differentials is related via interest parity conditions to the term structure of expected currency depreciation, if domestic and world capital markets are sufficiently integrated. The term structure of expected currency depreciation can be explicitly characterized in an exchange rate target zone.
It is the aim of this paper to analyse the term structure of interest rate differentials in a situation in which a small open economy faces a future entrance into a monetary union with its partner countries. In practice, the introduction of a common currency is typically initiated by a switch in exchange rate regime from a more or less floating system to an arrangement of completely fixed rates. For example, the introduction of the euro was cogently linked to the irreversible and complete fixing of the EMU countries' bilateral exchange rates at their central parities from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1 January 1999 onwards. Since an analogous procedure is likely to be applied for future EMU entrances on the basis of the EMS-II mechanism, the stylized models developed in the subsequent sections may be used for at least two purposes: (a) to study (ex post) the evolution of interest rates prior to EMU, and (b) for financial applications during the transition into EMU for future entrants.
The general set-up of this paper is in many respects similar to that in the aforementioned work of Svensson (1991b) . But, as will be shown below, in contrast to the problem addressed in his article, there exist analytically closedform and mathematically tractable solutions of the term structure of interest rate differentials under an anticipated entrance into a monetary union.
3 And more than that, such closed-form solutions exist under alternative exchange rate regimes prior to monetary union, namely under a free-float as well as under a managed-float pre-switch regime. This advantage can be exploited to pursue two objectives: First, it is possible to derive and explore the volatility of interest rate differentials of arbitrary maturities thus providing a shortcut to analysing the volatility processes of arbitrary-term interest rates. And second, the results under the alternative pre-switch regimes can be compared. These insights may then provide a useful tool for a broad range of financial applications (e.g. for interest-rate-sensitive security valuation).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews some previous results essential for further considerations, puts forward the general model set-up and derives closed-form solutions of the term structure of interest rate differentials under free-float and managed-float pre-switch regimes. Section 3 provides the regime comparison elaborating the main differences in the interest rate volatility processes under the respective regimes. It also discusses policy issues as well as aspects of applicability in financial management. Section 4 offers some concluding comments.
PRELIMINARIES, PREVIOUS RESULTS AND MODEL SET-UP

Exchange rate dynamics
We consider a world with two open economies under perfect capital mobility in which the domestic economy is assumed to be small. Now, let the political authorities of the two economies decide to create a monetary union in the future. On the analogy of Stage III of EMU, the authorities therefore announce at date t A to irreversibly fix the exchange rate from the future date t S onwards (i.e. t A ot S ) at the specific parity s.
To assess the exchange rate dynamics under such a time-contingent switch in exchange rate regime, it is convenient to consider the well-known monetary exchange rate model with flexible prices in continuous time. In this equilibrium model with rational expectations, the logarithmic spot rate at time t, x(t), equals the sum of two components: (a) an exogenously given 3. Under a credible target zone of the Krugman type, the term structure of interest rate differentials can be expressed as a solution to a partial differential equation with appropriate smooth-pasting conditions. Svensson (1991b, p. 97) outlines one direct numerical and one analytical method of obtaining this solution. However, the analytical closed-form Fourierseries solution consists of infinite sums and has to be analysed numerically in practice. fundamental k(t), which may be viewed as a collection of all economic and/or political factors that financial markets deem to be important for current exchange rate valuation, and (b) a speculative component representing the agents' expectations about future changes in the currency value. These two elements of currency pricing may be formalized as:
Interest Rate Volatility Prior to Monetary Union
where E[ Á | Á ] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set f(t) which contains all information available to market participants at time t.
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In the monetary flex-price model the fundamental k is an aggregate of given macroeconomic variables such as domestic and foreign money supplies and outputs. The dynamic structure imposed on k prior to the fixed-rate system represents the explicit regime of floating exchange rates prior to monetary union. In this paper, we consider two alternative pre-switch regimes of floating rates, namely a free-float and a managed-float system, respectively. A pure free-float pre-switch system (subsequently denoted by the subscript FF), in which the monetary authorities refrain from any interventions in foreign exchange markets, is typically modelled by letting the fundamental evolve over time as a Brownian motion, i.e. dkðtÞ dk FF ðtÞ ¼ s Á dzðtÞ tot S ð2Þ with s > 0 denoting the infinitesimal standard deviation and dz(t) the increment of a Wiener process.
In contrast to this, it may be desirable to model a managed-float exchange rate system (denoted by MF) prior to monetary union, i.e. to explicitly allow for central bank interventions which aim at stabilizing the exchange rate near some specified target parity. In general, there are a variety of ways to model a managed-float pre-switch regime. Throughout this paper, let us adopt a managed-float system which approximately reflects the situation prior to Stage III of EMU and which will also apply for future EMU entrants on the basis of the EMS-II system. 5 For this assume that the monetary authorities have pursued an explicit exchange rate target value for a longer time (e.g. the EMS central parity) and that this target value is, for whatever economic reasoning, bilaterally considered
denotes the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, it follows immediately that E[dx(t)|f(t)]/dt represents the expected (instantaneous) rate of change in the nominal exchange rate. In the monetary flex-price exchange rate model, the parameter a is the semielasticity of money demand with respect to a short-term interest rate. In equation (1), a may simply be viewed as a parameter weighting the fundamental component against the speculative motives for currency valuation. 5. Strictly speaking, prior to entrance into monetary union all EMU currencies were members of the EMS and as such kept in exchange rate bands of more or less wide bandwidths. Svensson (1992, p. 134) provides some justification for approximating exchange rate bands by a managed-float system.
as an adequate exchange rate equilibrium. Consequently, the authorities decide and announce at t A to use this equilibrium target value s as the conversion rate (i.e. the fixing parity) at date t S . According to equation (1) it seems consistent for the central banks to prevent the fundamental k from wandering too far away from the exchange rate target parity s. For simplicity, let us further assume that the monetary authorities keep the extent of their intervention activity stable until t S . 6 Such a leaning-against-the-wind policy is adequately modelled by a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with stochastic differential
where the quantity Z Á [s À k MF (t)] represents the force that keeps pulling the fundamental towards its long-run target value s with magnitude proportional to the current deviation of the process from the target s. The parameter ZZ0 indicates the strength of target-reversion property. Therefore, Z may be interpreted as a measure for the willingness and/or the capability of the central banks to stabilize the exchange rate x near the target parity by appropriate interventions in foreign exchange markets.
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In conjunction with the pre-switch regime-dependent specifications of the fundamental in equations (2) and (3), the general law of exchange rate evolution from (1) represents a stochastic differential equation. This can be solved by stochastic integration techniques and the imposition of adequate economic constraints which correctly reflect financial markets' anticipations of future exchange rate regime switching. Following Wilfling and Maennig (2001) the equilibrium exchange rate path under a free-float pre-switch system consists of the two branches
6. A more general modelling could cover two additional aspects: (a) the possibility of different exchange rate target values for the time before and after the announcement date t A , and (b) an increased degree of foreign exchange market interventions during the time interval [t A , t S ). The potential need to increase intervention activities was discussed prior to Stage III of EMU under the phrasing 'institutional frontloading'. The idea was to coordinate monetary policies of the accepted EMU countries already from the announcement date onwards in order to be prepared to repel possible speculative attacks (see De Grauwe, 1996, p. 24) . 7. The explicit role of the intervention parameter ZZ0 can be motivated further by the following two observations. Consider first the case Z 5 0. In this case the central banks refrain from intervening in foreign exchange markets and the stochastic differential (3) equals the free-float differential (2). Next, to understand the central bank behaviour represented by Z-N, consider the expectation and the variance of any future realization k MF (u), (see Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p. 172 
and
For the time after t S the exchange rate will be fixed by assumption so that for both pre-switch regimes one finds
for all tZt S .
The interest rate differential
Following the set-up in Svensson (1991a Svensson ( , 1991b ) let i* (t, t) denote the foreign nominal interest rate on a pure foreign-currency discount bond purchased at time t which matures at time t þ t. The small domestic economy cannot affect the foreign rate i* (t, t) by economic policy, but has to accept the foreign interest rate as exogenously given. The corresponding nominal domestic interest rate on a pure domestic-currency discount bond will accordingly be denoted by i(k(t), t, t). Note that the realization of the fundamental k -representing either the free-float pre-switch regime according to equation (2) or the managed-float pre-switch system according to equation (3) -is among the arguments of the domestic interest rate i. Further suppose that international investors consider the home and foreign bonds as perfect substitutes and assume perfect international capital mobility. Under this setting the following form of the uncovered interest parity condition should hold at all points in time: 8 IDðkðtÞ; t; tÞ iðkðtÞ; t; tÞ À i * ðt; tÞ ¼ E½xðt þ tÞjfðtÞ À xðtÞ t
8. To make the right-hand side of equation (9) plausible, let X(t) denote the exchange rate in levels, i.e. x(t) 5 ln[X(t)]. Furthermore, assume X( Á ) to be a deterministic function differentiable with respect to time. Then, for infinitesimal future dates, the uncovered interest parity condition claims that the interest rate differential equals the (expected) rate of change in the exchange rate, i.e.
Generalizing from infinitesimal to finite future dates and taking conditional expectations motivates the right-hand side of equation (9).
One special case included in equation (9) concerns the interest rate differential for so-called instantaneous bonds, i.e. for bonds with infinitesimally short time to maturity. These are defined by letting t-0 and signify extremely short-term interest rates (e.g. overnight rates). Bearing in mind footnote 4, the corresponding interest rate differential is obtained from equation (9) The equilibrium exchange rate paths (4) to (8) and the uncovered interest parity conditions (9) and (10) now allow us to compute closed-form solutions of interest rate differentials for arbitrary terms t under both pre-switch regimes. 9 In particular, consider first the free-float case. For the time prior to the announcement date, i.e. for tA[0, t A ), agents believe the free-float system to be permanent forever. In this case the differential for arbitrary term t equals zero on the whole time domain, i.e.
ID FF ðk FF ðtÞ; t; tÞ ¼ 0 for all t 2 ½0; t A Þ; t ! 0 ð11Þ During the interim period [t A , t S ) the analytical form of interest rate differentials is no longer independent of the term t. To be more explicit, the instantaneous interest rate differential for tA[t A , t S ) is found to be
while the differentials for strictly positive terms t > 0 evolve along two analytically distinct equilibrium paths which are separated from each other by the date t S À t: By analogous arguments, the managed-float counterparts of the interest rate differentials (11) to (14) may be derived. Making use of the exchange rate equilibrium path (6), the differential for tA[0, t A ) obtains as
9. The computations involve basic principles of stochastic calculus. The main difficulty consists of calculating the expected exchange rate E[x(t þ t)|f(t)]. But closed-form solutions of these expected values follow from well-known formulae for conditional expectations of Brownian motions and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (see e.g. Karlin and Taylor, 1981, Ch. 15) .
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In contrast to its free-float counterpart (11), the permanent managed-float differential (15) depends on the current fundamental k MF (t) and on the term t. For zero-term the instantaneous differential follows by means of standard calculus:
For the interim period [t A , t S ) it is straightforward to derive the instantaneous differential as
while the two branches of the equilibrium differential paths for t > 0 are given by
for tA[t A , t S À t) and
for tA[t S À t, t S ), respectively. Finally, it remains to specify the interest rate differential dynamics for the time after t S under each pre-switch regime. According to equation (8) the exchange rate will be fixed forever at the preannounced parity s from t S onwards. Hence, for both pre-switch regimes, equations (9) and (10) clearly provide ID FF ðk FF ðtÞ; t; tÞ ¼ ID MF ðk MF ðtÞ; t; tÞ ¼ 0 for all t ! t S ; t ! 0
3. REGIME COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Measuring the volatility of interest rate differentials
In order to measure volatility it is convenient to draw on the concept of the infinitesimal variance of interest rate differentials at time t. Loosely speaking, this dispersion measure -subsequently denoted by n 2 fIDðkðtÞ,t,tÞg -approximates the variance of interest rate differential realizations from the infinitesimally close future conditional upon all information included in the current information set f(t).
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One attractive feature of the infinitesimal variance n 2 fIDðkðtÞ,t,tÞg is that it can be computed conveniently by the well-known Ito lemma under very mild 10 . For details see Karlin and Taylor (1981, p. 159). assumptions. To be more explicit, consider the diffusion process 11 {y(t), tZ0} which is assumed to be an explicit function of the fundamental k, i.e. 
Via the rule (22) it is possible to derive analytically closed-form expressions of the infinitesimal variances of all interest rate differentials from the previous section. For this, recall that throughout this paper the fundamental k, determining the pre-switch exchange rate regime, is either modelled by a Brownian motion with stochastic differential (2), or by an OrnsteinUhlenbeck process with differential (3), i.e. either k 5 k FF or k 5 k MF . Both stochastic processes are time-homogeneous diffusion processes which have constant infinitesimal variances over time, namely, due to their parametrizations in equations (2) and (3) Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p. 169) .
In particular, assume first a free-float pre-switch exchange rate regime. For the time prior to the announcement date, tA[0, t A ), the corresponding interest rate differential (11) is constantly equal to zero for arbitrary terms. Consequently, its infinitesimal variance is given by n 2 fID FF ðk FF ðtÞ;t;tÞg ¼ 0 for all t 2 ½0; t A Þ; t ! 0
Focusing on the interim period [t A , t S ), the infinitesimal variances of the instantaneous differential (12) and both differential branches (13) and (14) for strictly positive terms t > 0 follow directly by the Ito rule (22) 
11. A diffusion process is defined as a continuous-time stochastic process whose trajectories are continuous with probability 1. 12. The mathematically precise conditions under which the Ito lemma is applicable are directed at the existence of certain derivatives of the defining function F in equation (21). For details, cf. Karlin and Taylor (1981, p. 347) .
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In the same manner, the infinitesimal variances of the interest rate differential paths (15) to (19) under a managed-float pre-switch exchange rate regime can be obtained. For tA[0, t A ), the variances of the permanent managed-float differentials (15) and (16) for strictly positive and zero terms are given respectively by n 2 fID MF ðk MF ðtÞ;t;0Þg ¼
During the interim period, Ito's lemma yields the following infinitesimal variances of the interest rate differential paths (17), (18) and (19) for tA[t A , t S ):
n 2 fID MF;1 ðk MF ðtÞ;t;tÞg ¼
n 2 fID MF;2 ðk MF ðtÞ;t;tÞg ¼
Besides the above volatility paths (23) to (31) for tA[0, t S ), it is straightforward to derive the infinitesimal variances of all interest rate differentials for the time after t S . It is evident from equation (20), that for tZt S the variances of arbitrary-term interest rate differentials vanish completely under both pre-switch regimes. This result is most intuitive since the interest parity conditions (9) and (10) imply constant zero-differentials under a system of fixed exchange rates.
Regime comparisons
The variance paths of arbitrary-term interest rate differentials presented in Section 3.1 can now be exploited for various volatility comparisons. Section 3.2.1 is dedicated to the question, how the political announcement at t A of future entrance into a monetary union affects interest rate differential volatility under the respective pre-switch exchange rate regimes. After that, the post-announcement volatility paths of arbitrary-term differentials under each pre-switch exchange rate system are analysed in greater detail. Figure 1 depicts the complete pre-and post-announcement variance paths consisting of the free-float sequences (23), (25), (26) and the managed-float sequences (28), (30) and (31) for the term t 5 1.0.
Pre-and post-announcement volatilities
13 Evidently, the announcement at date t A entails at least a temporary increase in interest rate differential volatility under both exchange rate regimes.
14 For a more formal elaboration, let us compare the pre-announcement variance paths (23), (27) and (28) Figure 1 Pre-and post-announcement variance paths 13. As can be seen from the axis labelling in Figure 1 , time t and henceforth also the dates t A , t S and the term t are measured in years. This timing convention implies the following units of measurement for the other structural parameters: the infinitesimal standard deviation s of the fundamental process is measured in units per ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi year p . The positive parameter a may be interpreted in different ways (see footnote 4). For example, if the general exchange rate equation (1) is viewed as the reduced-form specification of the monetary exchange rate model with flexible prices, a may be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to a short-term interest rate (cf. Froot and Obstfeld, 1992, pp. 62, 72) . On the other hand, equation (1) may simply be viewed as a mere asset price equation in which a measures the sensitivity of the exchange rate to its own expected future change. Adopting this view, 1/a can be interpreted as the subjective discount factor and a is given as a mere number (cf. De Grauwe et al., 1999, p. 197) . The intervention parameter Z is measured in units per year. 14. Observe that under both regimes the volatility paths tend to zero for t-t S (see the subsequent sections for formal confirmation). Hence, under the managed float, interest rate differential volatilities fall below the constant variance (28) (25) are strictly larger than zero for all tA[t A , t S À t), so that under a free-float pre-switch regime the political announcement unambiguously induces an increase in interest rate differential volatility. Under a managed-float pre-switch system, the situation is slightly more laborious since we have to distinguish between instantaneous differentials and differentials with strictly positive terms. Nevertheless, a direct comparison of the (constant) pre-announcement volatilities (27) and (28) with their ensuing post-announcement variance paths (29) and (30) also reveals a definite increase in interest rate differential volatility for all tA[t A , t S À t).
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Obviously, we have derived the following result. Independent of the specific pre-switch exchange rate regime, the mere political announcement at date t A of entrance into a monetary union at date t S entails, ceteris paribus, an immediate volatility increase in arbitrary-term interest rate differentials. If the pre-switch regime is a free-float, post-announcement volatility is permanently higher than pre-announcement volatility during the whole interim period. Under a managed-float pre-switch regime, post-announcement volatility is only higher than pre-announcement volatility for tA[t A , t S À t] while post-announcement volatility falls below the constant pre-announcement variance at some date in the interval [t S À t, t S ).
Why does the announcement of future time-contingent exchange rate fixing entail an -at least temporary -increase in differential volatility for arbitrary terms as opposed to the constant pre-announcement volatility paths under a permanent free-float or managed-float system? A most intuitive answer can be given by considering the free-float pre-switch arrangement. According to equation (4), the exchange rate x FF coincides exactly with the (driftless) Brownian-motion-fundamental k FF from equation (2) for all tot A . It therefore follows from a well-known property of the Brownian motion that the expected rate of change in the exchange rate over any finite time interval equals zero, implying interest rate differentials constantly equal to zero for arbitrary terms with zero variances for all tot A . Now, triggered by the announcement at t A of future exchange rate fixing at t S , the exchange rate x FF jumps from the equilibrium path (4) on the non-stationary saddlepath (5). From now on the dynamics of both, of the exchange rate as well as of the interest rate differential, depends on two components: (a) on the distribution of the fundamental, and (b) on the deterministic fixing parity s. Evidently, the first component induces the positive interest-rate-differential volatility.
In the end, under each of the respective pre-switch exchange rate regimes, the volatility increases in interest rate differentials result from the fact that 15. It is easy to see that the constant variance path (27) for instantaneous differentials always lies below the post-announcement variance path (29). In order to see that the constant preannouncement variance path (28) always lies completely below the post-announcement path (30) for all admissible t, observe first that (1 À e ÀZ Á t )/t 5 ( À 1) Á (e ÀZ Á t À 1)/t and that (e ÀZ Á t À 1)/to0. Moreover, (1 À e t/a )/to0. Hence, the term in the second pair of square brackets on the right-hand side of equation (30) is always larger in absolute value than (1 À e ÀZ Á t )/t for all tA[t A , t S À t] implying the above result.
the exchange rates x FF and x MF have to leave their stationary saddlepaths (4) and (6) in order to ensure an arbitrage-free transition into the fixed-rate system at date t S and that the interest rates have to react accordingly. Figure 2 displays the evolution of infinitesimal variances for alternative terms t during the interim period [t A , t S ) under a free-float pre-switch regime. The following relations are easy to verify and reveal some striking features of the variance paths (24), (25) and (26) 
The interim free-float regime
The derivatives in (32) imply that differential variances are (a) increasing over time for zero-term differentials during the whole interim period [t A , t S ), (b) increasing for strictly positive terms on the interval [t A , t S À t) and (c) decreasing for t > 0 on [t S À t, t S ). The limits in equations (34) and (35) give rise to the following question: why does differential volatility for strictly positive terms vanish completely at t S while the variance of instantaneous interest rate differentials does not? Note that the first limit for instantaneous interest rate differentials is different from zero with probability 1. 16 Obviously, strictly positiveterm domestic and foreign interest rates adjust completely during the interim period while instantaneous interest rates in general do not. An explanation for this difference is as follows: if interest rates for strictly positive term t40 did not adjust completely among the two economies at date t S , there would be room for riskless profits by buying the domestic and selling the foreign bond (or vice versa) infinitesimally shortly before t S . These riskless profit transactions can only be ruled out by a complete adjustment of domestic and foreign interest rates. But the necessity of complete interest rate equalization implies a volatility reduction towards zero. On the other hand, no such arbitrage opportunities exist for instantaneous bonds because at any date tA[t A , t S ) the time to maturity, t þ dt, always lies within the interim period. Hence, for instantaneous interest rates there is no need for a complete equalization at the date of transition into the fixed-rate system. Thus the stochastic fundamental k FF still has a significant impact on the interest rate differential. Consequently, according to equation (34), there remains the strictly positive infinitesimal variance s 2 /a 2 for t-t S . Apart from the evolution of interest rate volatility over time, it is important for various financial applications to analyse the impact of the term t on the volatility at any point in time. As will be shown below, there exists a clear-cut relationship between the degree of volatility and the term t under a free-float pre-switch regime. Before elaborating this, it proves convenient to consider the following auxiliary function of the term t:
Note the following properties of f :
(1) f (t)o0 for all t40; (2) f 0 (t) df (t)/dto0 for all t40.
16. To be mathematically precise: all limits of the stochastic processes {k FF } and {k MF } draw on the concept of convergence with probability 1.
Via these properties the partial derivatives of the volatility paths (25) and (26) 
These relations establish the following clear-cut result: along the ID FF,1 path, interest rate differentials for shorter terms exhibit lower volatility than differentials for longer terms. The reverse is true along the ID FF,2 path where differentials for longer terms exhibit less volatility than those for shorter terms. Clearly, as will be elucidated further in Section 3.2.3, the derivatives in equations (36) and (37) crucially hinge on the specific probabilistic structure of the underlying fundamental process k FF . However, neglecting mathematical exactness for a moment, an economic intuition of both derivatives under a free-float pre-switch regime can be given. For this, recall first the definition of the interest rate differential at present date t from equation (9) and consider the variance of the differential for an arbitrary future date u4t. It follows from equation (9) that the variance of ID(k(u), u, t) consists of two sources: (a) the variability of the expected exchange rate at time u þ t, and (b) the variability of the exchange rate at date u.
17 Now, for longer terms (e.g. for t 1 4t 2 ) the date u þ t lies in the more distant future (namely u þ t 1 4u þ t 2 ) and, under a free float (i.e. in the absence of any exchange rate stabilization activities), the volatility of more distant future rates is higher than the variability of exchange rates in the nearer future. Hence, the first source of interest rate differential variability is higher for longer than for shorter terms while the second source of differential variability is independent of the term t. This gives an intuition for the derivative in equation (36).
On the other hand, for longer terms the agents' exchange rate expectations are earlier completely tied down to the fixing parity s ( provided that the announcement of future entrance into monetary union is considered fully credible by the market). This implies that the first source of interest rate differential variability vanishes earlier under longer than under shorter terms, which gives an intuition for the derivative in equation (37).
There is, however, one aspect which needs some attention when comparing differentials with alternative terms. To illustrate, consider the terms t 1 and t 2 with t 1 ot 2 .
18 Equation (36) On the interval (t S À t 2 , t S À t 1 ) the t 1 differential is still on its ID FF,1 branch while the t 2 differential has already reached its ID FF,2 branch. From the relations in (32) and (33) it follows directly that the t 2 volatility path necessarily crosses the t 1 volatility path once from above on this interval (see the terms t 1 5 0.5 and t 2 5 1.0 in Figure 2 ). Figure 3 depicts the variance paths (29) to (31) during the interim period under a managed-float pre-switch regime for the alternative terms t 5 1.0, t 5 0.5 and t-0. At first glance the volatility paths exhibit striking similarities to their counterparts under a free float. The volatility paths (29) and (30) for instantaneous and ID MF,1 differentials seem increasing on their admissible domains while the ID MF,2 variance path (31) is decreasing over time and obviously tends to zero for t-t S . Indeed, it is straightforward to verify the relations (32) to (35) -which are all valid under an interim free float -also for the managed-float volatility paths (29) to (31). Among these relations only the validity of (34) is somewhat surprising. Evidently, at the moment of transition into the fixed-rate system, the volatility of instantaneous differentials, which equals s 2 /a 2 , is independent of the parameter Z. In other words, shortly before t S instantaneous rates are always subject to exactly the same amount of volatility regardless of the intensity of central bank interventions.
The interim managed-float regime
Further evidence of the singularity of instantaneous interest rates as opposed to strictly positive-term rates is provided by the following result: consider a situation in which the central banks are willing (and able) to defend the parity s by any necessary amount of intervention at any date B. Wilfling during the interim period [t A , t S ). Put differently, the authorities de facto implement a fixed-rate system at the announcement date t A . According to footnote 7, this extreme willingness to intervene is reflected by letting Z-N in the volatility paths (29) to (31). It is easy to check that for t > 0 the ID MF,1 and ID MF,2 variance paths (30) and (31) a 2 for all tA[t A , t S ). This establishes another interesting result: instantaneous differentials remain volatile during the interim period even under an infinitely high degree of intervention while differentials for strictly positive terms become certain (i.e. have zero variances) under the same intervention policy.
Finally, we address the relation between the term t and differential volatility. First, recall that under an interim free-float there exists a unique volatility ranking for strictly positive terms: along the ID FF,1 path longer terms imply higher volatility than shorter terms while the reverse is true along the ID FF,2 path. Under a managed float an analogous result may only be derived analytically for the ID MF,2 variance path (31) for all tA[t S À t, t S ) and arbitrary values of the intervention parameter Z. Hence, in accordance with (37), under a managed float longer-term differentials are less volatile than shorter-term differentials along the ID MF,2 path. But in contrast to the free-float case no clear-cut relation between differential volatility and the term t40 exists any more along the ID MF,1 path. This becomes evident from Figures 3 and 4. The 'low' Z-value of 0.2 in Figure 3 leads to the same ID MF,1 volatility structure as under a free float with higher variances for longer terms. In contrast to this, the 'high' Z-value of 1.0 in Figure 4 , ceteris paribus, entails exactly the reverse volatility ranking with respect to t.
What may be the intuition of this latter phenomenon? On the analogy of the intuitive reasoning for the derivative from equation (36) under a free-float pre-switch regime, recall the two sources of the variance of ID(k(u), u, t) for u4t according to equation (9): (a) the volatility of the (expected) exchange rate at time u þ t, and (b) the (term-independent) variability of the exchange rate at date u. Now, under 'low' Z-values the managed float is very similar to a free float in that the monetary authorities refrain from excessive exchange rate stabilization policies. Consequently, the volatility of more distant future rates is usually higher than the variability of rates in the close future, Interest Rate Volatility Prior to Monetary Union r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 implying -through the first volatility source -higher interest rate differential variability for longer than for shorter terms. On the other hand, under a 'high' Z-value the authorities intervene frequently to stabilize the exchange rate near its target value. Therefore, the more distant the future exchange rate, the higher the probability that the authorities will have intervened to stabilize it at the target parity. In view of this intervention policy, more distant future exchange rates may have smaller variances than closer exchange rates which can temporarily deviate from the target rate. This might (through the first variability source) explain the lower variability of longer-term interest rate differentials in comparison with the variability of shorter-term differentials under a high degree of intervention.
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Obviously, the intervention parameter Z plays a crucial role for the relation between differential volatility and the term. The figures give rise to the conjecture that there may exist the following unique relation between t and differential volatility along the ID MF,1 path: depending on the (constant) level of intervention, the ID MF,1 variance paths for longer terms always lie either completely above or completely below those for shorter terms. It can be shown that this last conjecture is definitely false in general. For example, using the following series of structural parameters, Z 5 0.5, a 5 1.0, s 5 2.0, t A 5 0.5, t S 5 2.5, one may check by direct computation that the ID MF,1 variance paths belonging to the respective terms t 5 0.05 and t 5 0.1 cross once on the interval [0.5, 2.4).
A further conjecture may stem from the limits in (38). For any t40 there is a pointwise volatility convergence towards zero at every interim date tA[t A , t S ) 19. The necessity to distinguish between 'low' and 'high' Z-values raises a practical question:
which values for the intervention parameter Z can we expect to find in real-world data? The answer to this depends on the degree of managed floating that central banks are willing and/ or able to maintain. For an empirical investigation see Lindberg and Söderlind (1992, p. 22) who estimate an Z-value of 3.6842 for the Swedish krona vis-à-vis a trade-weighted currency basket from exchange rate data covering the period between June 1985 and November 1990. if the central banks' willingness to intervene becomes maximal (i.e. for Z-N).
From this one might be inclined to think that an increase in Z, ceteris paribus, possibly entails a decrease in the variance paths on their admissible domains. Figure 5 shows three complete variance paths which only differ in their intervention parameters. Obviously, the two paths generated with Z 1 5 1.0 and Z 2 5 1.5 cross, indicating that the conjecture does not hold in general.
Applicability and policy issues
Financial models which capture the volatility of interest rates serve at least two purposes (cf. Chan et al., 1992 Chan et al., , p. 1210 . First, the volatility of ( primarily short-term) interest rates is a key variable for the valuation of contingent claims such as interest rate options. Second, the level of term structure volatility plays a crucial role in the selection of optimal hedging strategies for risk-averse investors. Therefore, it seems warranted to assess the above results on interest rate variability empirically and to make use of this knowledge in financial applications. The econometric treatment of the volatility processes of interest rate differentials turns out to be a difficult matter from a technical point of view. A suitable estimation procedure should cover all unknown parameters from the differential paths (12) to (19). In the most general setting, these unknown parameters are a, s and the intervention parameter Z.
A prominent technique of estimating continuous-time processes from discrete data which has been applied to exchange rate data is the method of Simulated Moments (SM estimation).
20 However, Wilfling (2001, p. 190) Pakes and Pollard (1989) or Lee and Ingram (1991) . For an application to exchange rate data see Smith and Spencer (1992) and Söderlind (1992, 1994) .
Interest Rate Volatility Prior to Monetary Union
r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 argues that the application of the SM technique for estimating the above interest rate differential processes seems highly questionable because of missing stationarity and ergodicity properties. Alternative estimation methods can be found in Hansen et al. (1998) , Darolles and Gouriéroux (2001) and Elerian et al. (2001) . By now, the statistical properties of these approaches are far from being settled. Applications as well as statistical comparisons of the estimation procedures mark a challenging task for future econometric research.
From an economic policy perspective, the complete term structure of interest rate differentials developed and analysed in the preceding sections may provide useful insights into several macroeconomic phenomena prior to monetary union. To begin with, let us have a closer look at the exchange rate sequences (4) to (7) under each pre-switch regime. Using the Ito transformation formula (22), it is straightforward to check that under each pre-switch regime the mere announcement at t A of future exchange rate fixing at t S triggers an unambiguous reduction in instantaneous exchange rate variances during the interim period. If monetary policy is geared towards the stabilization of financial variables such as exchange and interest rates, the reduction in exchange rate volatility by the announcement of future entrance into a monetary union alone -i.e. without any central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets -may give the impression of a free lunch at first glance. However, in Section 3.2.1 it is shown that under each pre-switch regime the volatility of arbitrary-term interest rate differentials is at least temporarily increased in response to the announcement of future exchange rate regime switching (see Figure 1) . 21 In terms of a macroeconomic costbenefit analysis this result may be phrased as follows: irrespective of the specific pre-switch regime, the economies under consideration have to pay for the reduction in exchange rate volatility by an at least temporary increase in the uncertainty about the evolution of domestic interest rates.
Alternative practices of targeting and stabilizing arbitrary-term interest rates by appropriate intervention policies with the objective of stabilizing the economy have been theoretically described and empirically documented in the literature. 22 Obviously, the volatility equations (29), (30) and (31) for interest rate differentials under a managed-float pre-switch regime provide a formal relation supporting the policy option of interest rate stabilization via suitable foreign exchange market interventions. With respect to currencies, the impacts of foreign exchange market interventions on exchange rate volatility have been and still are an important topic of empirical research. Instead of reducing volatility -as might be intuitively conjectured -there is some econometric evidence that past interventions have rather increased exchange rate variability. 23 21. For a similar tradeoff between exchange rate and interest rate variability see Svensson (1991a) who describes the situation in exchange rate target zones. 22. See, for example, Balduzzi et al. (1997) and the references cited there. 23. See, for example, Osterberg (1997a, 1997b) or Dominguez (1998). However, with respect to interest rates, the aforementioned volatility paths (29) to (31) establish a clear theoretical foundation for the ambiguous impacts of foreign exchange market interventions on interest rate volatility. To see this, consider again Figure 5 , which conveys an idea of the difficulty that central banks may face in fine-tuning the extent of foreign exchange market interventions in order to stabilize interest rates. Assume that the present degree of intervention is represented by Z 1 5 1.0. Evidently, a modest intensification of intervention activities from Z 1 5 1.0 to Z 2 5 1.5 would, ceteris paribus, entail an increase in interest rate volatility in the short run, while in the middle and in the long run volatility is reduced. On the other hand, the increase of intervention activities on a larger scale (e.g. from Z 1 5 1.0 to Z 3 5 3.0) leads to an interest rate volatility decline for the rest of the interim period.
Up to this point, one central assumption was that the monetary authorities do not modify their exchange rate policy at the announcement date t A , i.e. they retain either the free-float or the managed-float system until the entrance into monetary union. Clearly, other scenarios are conceivable and have indeed been discussed intensively prior to Stage III of EMU. To give an example, recall that prior to 1 January 1999, all EMU currencies had been kept for several years in bilateral exchange rate bands of more or less wide bandwidths which -according to footnote 5 -can be approximated by managed-float systems. Bearing this in mind and translating into the formal framework of this paper, Begg et al. (1997, p. 60) proposed a policy design for the interim period according to which the authorities should announce the bilateral fixing parities at date t A and then go over to free-floating during the interim period.
The impact of a switch from a pre-announcement managed-float to a postannouncement free-float exchange rate regime on arbitrary-term interest rate differential volatility may be analysed exactly by a comparison of the variance paths (27) and (28) with the continuations (24) and (25). Although Figure 1 exhibits a temporary volatility increase for the chosen set of structural parameters, the derivation of a general result crucially hinges on the intervention parameter Z and turns out to be difficult. In contrast to this, a switch from a pre-announcement free float to a post-announcement managed float entails a clear-cut result. Since, according to equation (23), the instantaneous variances of arbitrary-term interest rate differentials are constantly equal to zero under a pre-announcement free float, a switch to a post-announcement managed float with volatility paths (29), (30) and (31) unambiguously implies a volatility increase of arbitrary-term interest rate differentials during the interim period.
Finally, a further switch between pre-and post-announcement exchange rate regimes is conceivable. In order to credibly steer market exchange rates towards the pre-announced fixing parity s at the end of the interim period, the central banks have the possibility of continuously tightening the allowable ranges of bilateral exchange rate variation. Such an interim exchange rate system may be thought of as a managed float with increasing intervention activity over time and has also been discussed intensively as a strategy for implementing Stage III of EMU. 24 A suitable stochastic process for the fundamental k to model such a regime is the so-called Brownian bridge as described in Miller and Sutherland (1994, p. 810) . It is straightforward to compute exchange rate and interest rate differential dynamics under this interim system and to perform the analogous analysis from above.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on a monetary flex-price exchange rate model this paper derives closedform solutions of the term structure of interest rate differentials when the economies under consideration plan to enter a monetary union. Two alternative systems of floating exchange rates prior to entrance into the union are considered, namely a free-float and a managed-float pre-switch regime. The respective term structures of interest rate differentials are compared with respect to volatility properties. The economic significance in exploring differential volatility stems from the fact that for domestic investors of a small open economy, which -under perfect capital mobilityfaces an exogenous term structure of world interest rates, the volatility of interest rate differentials may serve as an important predictor of the volatility of domestic interest rates.
Under a free-float pre-switch regime there exists a clear-cut relationship between the volatility of interest rate differentials and the term. At the beginning of the interim period lower-term differentials exhibit less volatility than longer-term differentials while the reverse is true on an exactly specified time interval at the end of the interim period. Under a managed float this volatility ranking no longer holds in general. This lack is due to the intervention parameter Z.
Evidently, the possibility of central-bank intervention -aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate before the fixing -introduces strong parameter nonlinearities into the dynamics of interest rates prior to the switch. These nonlinearities give rise to a wide spectrum of possible volatility processes prior to the introduction of the common currency and therefore may have significant impacts on financial applications. The problem may aggravate if the central banks decide -for whatever reasons -to change the intensity of their intervention policy. Clearly, frequent unforeseeable changes in the parameter Z introduce further complexities into the evolution of interest rate variances.
Another insight concerns the singular role of instantaneous interest rates whose importance for the theory of bond and option pricing are well documented in the literature (see, for example, Cochrane, 2000, Part III) . In contrast to all strictly positive-term interest rate differentials, instantaneous 24 . See footnote 6 as well as Obstfeld (1998) and the literature cited there. differentials can remain excessively volatile under an exchange rate arrangement which is characterized by extremely high leaning-against-thewind interventions.
Finally, the paper discusses econometric and policy issues. Two challenging tasks for future research consist of developing new as well as gathering experience with existing econometric techniques for estimating and drawing statistical inference from interest rate volatility processes during the transitional period between the exchange rate regimes.
With respect to policy issues several further questions are of interest for future research. For example, the analysis of the preceding sections presumes absolute credibility of both the announced timetable of exchange rate regime switching as well as credibility of the announced fixing parity. Wilfling and Maennig (2001) develop an exchange rate model which allows for market uncertainty about the punctuality of the switch from floating to fixed rates by supposing that market participants associate a specific probability measure with the remaining lifetime of the pre-switch regime of floating rates. As in this paper, the exchange rate dynamics developed there can be used to derive a complete term structure of interest rate differentials under this kind of uncertainty. Similarly, a lack of credibility of the announced fixing parity may have severe impacts on exchange rate dynamics and therefore also on interest rate differentials. However, this latter credibility problem may be analysed in different ways. As a fruitful starting point into this topic see De Grauwe et al. (1998, p. 7) .
A final model extension which will be of interest especially for upcoming EMU entrants hinges on the fact that the modelling strategy in this paper assumes that market participants are fully taken by surprise by the announcement of future exchange rate regime switching to a fixed rate system. In reality, market participants are likely to have some anticipations that an announcement will be made in that they may attach certain probabilities to the prospect of currency union prior to the official announcement date. This issue and its impacts on exchange rate dynamics prior to the announcement are discussed in De Grauwe et al. (1999) . Their results may be used to make the interest rate differential models from this paper more realistic in this dimension.
